A federal judge in Washington, DC has ruled that a woman who was injured in a slip-and-fall accident outside a public school cannot rely on a fire department incident report to satisfy the notice requirements of the District of Columbia’s tort claims statute.

The case arose on January 8, 2025, when Star Dehaarte, an employee of the District of Columbia Public Schools, slipped on ice outside the school where she worked. She briefly lost consciousness and was transported to a hospital by ambulance. She was subsequently diagnosed with a severe concussion and advised that she could not return to work until medically cleared.

Dehaarte reported the injury to school officials, including Principal Shawna Dix, and submitted medical documentation supporting her request for leave. She alleged that Dix subsequently told other employees that Dehaarte had not been injured, but was instead “attending women’s health appointments.” Dehaarte later received a negative performance evaluation and was “separated from the school system” in August 2025.

Dehaarte filed suit pro se against the District of Columbia, alleging several claims, including negligent supervision and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The tort claims were based on the principal’s alleged failure to properly report or handle her injury and the inappropriate disclosure of confidential medical information. She did not allege negligence for her slip and fall.

The District sought dismissal of the tort claims on the grounds that Dehaarte failed to comply with the notice requirement contained in DC Code § 12-309, which provides:

• [A]n action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliquidated damages to person or property unless, within six months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage. A report in writing by the Metropolitan Police Department, in regular course of duty, is a sufficient notice under this section.

The court initially ruled that Dehaarte had not demonstrated compliance with the statute, barring her from pursuing her common law tort claims. Dehaarte sought reconsideration, arguing that a run report or patient care report prepared by the DC Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department documenting her ambulance transport satisfies the notice requirement.

US Magistrate Judge G. Michael Harvey rejected her argument. Judge Harvey explained:

• [A] report from the D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department … would almost certainly be … deficient in providing notice of the common law tort claims asserted here because there is no reason to think the department had knowledge of Dix’s alleged tortious conduct.
• It would also fail because the statute does not recognize a report from the fire department as satisfactory notice.
• “The only statutory exception to the requirement of formal notice to the Mayor is an MPD report, and [courts] are ‘not free to go beyond the express language of the statute and authorize any additional documents to meet its requirements.'”

The court also cited Campbell v. District of Columbia, 568 A.2d 1076 (D.C. 1990), in which the DC Court of Appeals expressly held that a fire department report does not satisfy the statute.

Here is a copy of the decision.

Advanced Issue: Legal Eagles will note a distinction in the notice requirement in DC Code § 12-309 between unliquidated and liquidated damages. It is a rather advanced topic that probably does not warrant much attention within the confines of our discussion centering on whether a fire report is enough to put a municipal entity on notice for purposes of the tort claims act. (Isn’t that complicated enough???)

However, for those who may be interested, unliquidated damages are damages whose amount has not been predetermined or established and must be determined by a court or jury. Examples include compensation for pain and suffering, emotional distress, and other injuries whose monetary value requires judicial determination.

By contrast, liquidated damages are amounts that are fixed or can be calculated with certainty, such as a specified amount of unpaid wages. The court ruled that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with DC’s statutory notice requirement barred her claims for unliquidated damages, but did not bar her claims for declaratory relief, back pay, and benefits.