A federal judge has granted summary judgment to the City of New York in a long-running discrimination suit brought by two FDNY EMS officers and their union challenging the promotional process for EMS officers.

The suit was originally filed in 2018 by AFSME Local 3621 (EMS Officers Union), EMS Lieutenant Renae Mascol, and EMS Lieutenant Luis Rodriguez. They alleged that women and non-white EMS officers were underrepresented in the higher ranks and that FDNY’s promotional process allowed excessive subjectivity and discretion that adversely affected minority and female candidates.

Both Mascol and Rodriguez were EMS lieutenants when the dispute arose and were subsequently promoted. Mascol was promoted to EMS Captain in 2020 and later to EMS Deputy Chief. Rodriguez was promoted to EMS Captain effective in January 2019 and to EMS Deputy Chief in 2021.

The litigation focused on promotions within the Supervising Emergency Medical Service Specialist civil-service title, which includes the ranks of EMS lieutenant, captain, deputy chief, and division chief/commander. Unlike promotion to lieutenant, promotion to the higher ranks does not require another civil-service examination.

To be eligible for promotion to EMS Captain, an EMS lieutenant must have four years in rank, meet minimum performance-evaluation requirements, and have a clean disciplinary history during the preceding two years. Eligible candidates apply and are interviewed by a three-member panel, which scores the candidates.

The plaintiffs initially focused their challenge on the subjective aspects of the promotional process. During the litigation, however, they also challenged the eligibility requirements themselves, contending they had a disparate impact on minority and female EMS lieutenants.

In September 2025, Judge Lewis J. Liman granted the city summary judgment on most of the plaintiffs’ claims. However, he left open the possibility that Mascol and Rodriguez could pursue disparate-impact claims for periods before they became eligible for promotion if they could establish that, but for the challenged eligibility requirements, they would have applied for promotion. Here is our earlier coverage of the case.

The problem for Mascol and Rodriguez was proving they would have applied for promotion. Quoting from the decision:

• A sign that says “do not apply” can cause as grievous harm to the person who—based on that sign—does not apply as to a person who applies and is denied.
• That said, however, the injury is not prosecutable by the world.
• In order for a nonapplicant to show that he or she was the victim of unlawful discrimination, [ie has standing] the plaintiff must show that he would have applied for the position, absent the allegedly discriminatory conduct.
• Such a showing may be made by evidence of “informal inquiry, expression of interest, or even an unexpressed desire that is credible and convincing.”
• In order for Plaintiffs to proceed with their case and to put Defendant to the burden of challenging Plaintiffs’ prima facie case or addressing whether it is liable for employment discrimination, Plaintiffs—like any litigant before the Court—must show that they have standing and can establish each element of their case.
• Plaintiffs have failed to offer evidence sufficient to show that there is a triable issue of fact.
• Mascol and Rodriguez each submitted a declaration, dated December 12, 2025, stating that “I was also directly harmed because I was deemed ineligible to apply due to the heightened eligibility requirements” and that “intent is further demonstrated by the fact that I have literally applied to every promotion I could.”
• Plaintiffs offer no evidence that they asked about the eligibility requirements or promotional opportunities before they were eligible, that they made any informal inquiries, or that they ever expressed an interest in promotion before they were eligible.
• They do not even aver that they were interested at a particular earlier date before the date upon which they became eligible.
• Plaintiffs’ failure to offer evidence provides sufficient grounds for the dismissal of their Title VII and NYCHRL and NYSHRL claims.

The court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment. It also denied Mascol’s motion for reconsideration and denied the renewed motion for class certification as moot.

Here is a copy of the decision, handed down September 10, 2026.