Language Selection

Get healthy now with MedBeds!
Click here to book your session

Protect your whole family with Orgo-Life® Quantum MedBed Energy Technology® devices.

Advertising by Adpathway

         

 Advertising by Adpathway

JPL at 90: Whose lab is it?

3 hours ago 3

PROTECT YOUR DNA WITH QUANTUM TECHNOLOGY

Orgo-Life the new way to the future

  Advertising by Adpathway

Casey Dreier

Written by Casey Dreier
Chief of Space Policy, The Planetary Society
November 20, 2026

On Halloween 1936, a group of Caltech graduate students hauled a small rocket they had built into the Arroyo Seco, north of Pasadena, California, and tried to launch it. It failed. But that ignominious moment is considered the unofficial birthday of NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), which turned 90 in October 2026.

JPL is not technically a NASA center. It is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC), paid for by the government but managed by a private entity: the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), which has run it for 90 years. Caltech’s contract renews every five years, and until this year every renewal had been automatic. In 2026, for the first time, NASA announced that it would compete the contract to manage JPL. Texas A&M University has submitted a bid, and there could be others.

Peter Westwick literally wrote the book on this period of the lab’s history: “Into the Black: JPL and the American Space Program, 1976–2004.” He is the director of the Aerospace History Project at the Huntington-USC Institute on California and the West and a faculty member at the University of Southern California. He joined me on the Space Policy Edition of Planetary Radio to discuss JPL’s history, its relationships with Caltech and NASA, and a long-running question: Is it Caltech’s JPL or NASA’s JPL? The episode aired on Nov. 6, 2026.

The transcript below has been edited for length and clarity. Listen to the full episode here.

Casey Dreier: How did JPL start? Did it come from Caltech, or did it come from the government?

Peter Westwick: It started as an Army lab going back to the 1930s. A group of graduate students at Caltech were working on rockets, and some folks in the Army got wind of it because they were very connected to other aeronautics work at Caltech. The Army got interested and started supporting this work under a contract with Caltech. This is before JPL actually exists; they’re just supporting a research project at Caltech.

World War II comes along, and the Army ramps up its work, especially on rockets for what they called jet-assisted takeoff: attaching rockets to the wings of an airplane to help it take off in a short distance, from short runways and from aircraft carriers. So the project grows with Army support during World War II and actually gets into mass production of these rockets.

I think the actual formation date of what they called the Jet Propulsion Laboratory was 1944. They located it at a site off campus after some early rocket experiments had an unfortunate tendency to explode in campus buildings. It grows under Army support through the early Cold War, working on first short-range, then intermediate-range rockets against the Soviets. Then the Space Race comes along — Sputnik, the potential for satellites, and then spacecraft to the Moon and other planets. JPL is transferred from the Army into this new agency, NASA. It is the only one of the major centers that was not previously a center under the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). Ever since, JPL has been working under NASA, initially focused on planetary spacecraft, and it has diversified since then.

First rocket motor test in the Arroyo Seco, 1936 First rocket motor test in the Arroyo Seco, 1936 Members of the Caltech rocketry group prepare a rocket motor test in the Arroyo Seco near Pasadena on Oct. 31, 1936. The test is considered the founding moment of what became NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory.Image: NASA/JPL-Caltech

Casey Dreier: Is that why it’s called the Jet Propulsion Laboratory — because they were propelling jets to take off faster by attaching rockets to them?

Peter Westwick: Yeah, there was that. But there was also a bit of branding going on. There’s a famous early quote from some of the folks involved that rockets were seen as Buck Rogers stuff, not entirely worthy of high academic attention at the time. So “jet propulsion” seemed a more appropriate name than “rocket propulsion.” I think part of the reason for the name was to spin it a little bit.

Casey Dreier: Could JPL have happened anywhere, or was there something about Southern California in that era that led to JPL not just existing, but ultimately thriving?

Peter Westwick: One of the reasons the Army came to Caltech was that the Army was already working very closely with Caltech on problems of aeronautics and aviation. In the mid-1920s, Caltech decided to make itself into a major center for aeronautics. They hired away Theodore von Kármán, who at the time was one of the world’s leading authorities on aeronautics, brought him to the United States, and got funding from the Guggenheim Foundation to create the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory at the California Institute of Technology — GALCIT.

This was very much a conscious effort on the part of Caltech’s leaders. They saw aeronautics as one of the major future industries, and together with local boosters around Los Angeles, they decided to make Southern California the center for it, the way Detroit was emerging as the center of the auto industry. And they succeeded.

At the time, the Army was in charge of American military aircraft. What we now think of as the Air Force was under the Army, as the Army Air Service and then the Army Air Corps. So the Army is working with these local aircraft builders in Southern California, and General Hap Arnold was very much a presence around Southern California. He knew von Kármán well and was seeing him constantly. The local aircraft firms were testing their aircraft in the wind tunnels at Caltech. So when von Kármán alerted Arnold to the fact that these graduate students were working on rocketry, it was completely understandable how Caltech got Army support for this rocket project.

Casey Dreier: It’s astonishing how different that decision process is: Some graduate students are blowing up rockets, so maybe the Army should invest and make this a rocket center of excellence.

Peter Westwick: Well, in the context of the late 1930s, war is looming, the situation in Europe is increasingly dire, and there’s a sense that war might be on the horizon and we need to start mobilizing for it. That Army contract was very much part of that context.

Casey Dreier: At the time, rockets that went beyond Earth weren’t necessarily taken seriously, but missiles must have seemed more reasonable. Was there any longer game among JPL’s founders to send things into space, or was it resolutely about building missiles from the beginning, with space coming as an opportunity later?

Peter Westwick: It’s a tricky question. The focus in the ’20s and ’30s was really on aircraft: going from wood aircraft to metal aircraft, working on propulsion systems and flight controls. The sense was that in the next war, aircraft were going to be the major difference maker, and rockets weren’t going to play a role except as an additional technology to help an airplane take off, not as a standalone weapon system. Of course, the Nazis had other ideas with the V-1 and the V-2, but in the United States that wasn’t really a thing until the Nazis demonstrated the possibilities.

Casey Dreier: So this wasn’t like Wernher von Braun, who had ambitions for spaceflight and then found a way to work with the Army, or Robert Goddard, who was fantasizing about space travel?

Peter Westwick: The graduate students were definitely thinking about it, and there were amateur groups — Goddard was an example — who thought about rockets as a vehicle for humans to access outer space. But as far as the Army was concerned, it was focused on more immediate objectives.

Casey Dreier: I’m asking because of this idea of JPL having to adapt throughout its existence. Was there a common thread of space exploration looking for a way to express itself, or was it more opportunistic?

Peter Westwick: From the 1930s through World War II into the early Cold War, the work for the Army was really directed toward rockets for military purposes. In World War II, that meant the jet-assisted takeoff rockets. In the early Cold War, it meant a succession of short-range and then what would later be called intermediate-range ballistic missiles to deliver warheads to targets. That included nuclear warheads: The Corporal and Sergeant missiles in the 1950s were designed to carry nuclear warheads in an eventual conflict with the Soviet Union. The Army was not paying for this work so that these Caltech folks could explore outer space. They had their eyes on the prize, and the prize was defeating the Soviets in the Cold War.

Casey Dreier: During the 1950s, was Caltech’s faculty happy that JPL was part of the Army? Working with the Department of Defense became a source of tension later on. Was it one then?

Peter Westwick: In this period, it is safe to say that, with very few exceptions, Caltech and JPL were very much on board with working for the military. A lot of Caltech faculty had worked on military projects during World War II, including another rocket program, not under JPL, on attack rockets. The leadership of Caltech in the early Cold War had some qualms about Caltech’s association with military work in general and its implications. But for the most part, they were very much on board: National security is a national priority, and we will work toward it.

Casey Dreier: How did JPL get Explorer 1 and finally get into the space business?

Peter Westwick: JPL got the job of designing the little vehicle that went on top of the rocket that launched the first American satellite into orbit, the response to Sputnik. Eisenhower wanted the American response to Sputnik to be a civilian enterprise, not a military project — and that might’ve involved a little bit of sheep-dipping. But the initial effort [Vanguard], of course, blew up. With the American public and Congress breathing down the administration’s necks, Eisenhower basically said, “OK, JPL and von Braun, you step up and get us a satellite into space.” That satellite was JPL’s Explorer. This is the famous photo of von Braun and [JPL Director William] Pickering holding up the Explorer model in the auditorium of the National Academy of Sciences.

 Explorer 1 The original American spacecraft celebration: Explorer 1 At a 1958 press conference following the launch of Explorer 1, three key team members triumphantly hoist a full-scale model of the satellite for the media. From left to right: William H. Pickering, director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory; Dr. James Van Allen, University of Iowa physicist; Wernher von Braun, designer of the Explorer 1's Jupiter-C launch vehicle.Image: NASA

Casey Dreier: This is the crux of JPL’s ongoing identity tensions. When JPL becomes part of NASA, it’s not a NASA center in the way the others are. It’s not federally run; it’s its own thing. Why is JPL unique in that context, and what class of institution is it? It’s not unique in government, but it’s unique within NASA.

Peter Westwick: There are many others. At one point they were called GOCOs — government-owned, contractor-operated — and later FFRDCs. There are examples especially in the national laboratory system, which was originally under the Atomic Energy Commission and then under the Department of Energy when it was formed in the 1970s. The labs at Los Alamos, Livermore, Berkeley, Oak Ridge, Brookhaven, and Argonne are operated by contractors and not owned by the federal government.

NASA is a little bit different in that it inherited a network of laboratories, which it called centers, from the NACA, which goes back to World War I and work on airplanes. NASA takes over all of these NACA centers, but it also wants JPL’s capabilities. JPL is working on rockets, and it has developed a bunch of skills in guidance and control and especially radio telemetry for its rockets. NASA basically takes JPL away from the Army and says, “Your skills in telemetry especially will apply to what we want to do with automated spacecraft, which we’re going to have to be able to communicate with, guide, and control. JPL, you’re the best ones to take that job.”

At that point, rocket research was basically being handed off to industry, and NASA already had other places working on rockets. So JPL could say, “The rocket work might be fizzling out, so to speak, but spacecraft look like the job of the future, so let’s do it.” JPL and Caltech were amenable, and NASA took JPL off the Army’s hands wholesale.

Casey Dreier: So NASA pays Caltech an annual management fee, Caltech runs JPL for NASA, and all the hardware there is paid for by NASA. JPL has an allegiance to both Caltech and the space agency, and JPL is also its own thing in a way that other NASA centers aren’t.

Peter Westwick: Right. And this is a really difficult relationship because it’s a three-body problem, as they say, or a triangle: JPL at one vertex, then Caltech, then NASA. JPL is the only NASA center that’s operated under contract, with Caltech. It goes back to JPL always being a Caltech project, starting with the rocket research in the 1930s. It grew and grew, they maintained Caltech’s oversight as it grew, and when NASA took it over, Caltech came along as the administrator.

All JPL staff are Caltech employees; their paychecks come from Caltech. The idea is that this helps with recruiting and retaining staff, because Caltech is your employer. Caltech definitely has some cachet as one of the leading engineering institutions in the world, and the contract provides a kind of elitism by association. The contract also provides a measure of independence from NASA. In theory, it allows JPL to do things without NASA bureaucrats looking over its shoulder all the time.

There’s a geographic component, too: JPL is about as far from Washington, D.C., as you can get in the continental United States. So there is administrative distance and geographic distance, and that allows JPL to be more innovative. The Caltech environment, of course, also encourages innovation. In return, NASA pays Caltech a management fee plus some overhead to cover administrative expenses. That relationship has continued to this day, but with occasional struggles, tensions, and questions from basically every side.

Casey Dreier: You note a question that’s frequently asked: Is it NASA’s JPL or Caltech’s JPL? Whose JPL is it?

Peter Westwick: Both institutions, I think, would answer that it’s theirs. NASA says it’s ours, and Caltech says, “No, it’s ours. That’s why you’re paying us every year. Why are you paying us if it’s not ours?” Caltech has been the only contractor since the lab’s founding, going back to World War II and before that to the 1930s, but that is now being questioned.

There’s also another issue: JPL eventually grows to be far bigger than Caltech itself. Caltech has always prided itself on remaining really small and really elite, with the idea that it can be more nimble and not get bogged down with big stuff. The problem, from the view of the Caltech faculty, is that it becomes the tail wagging the dog. Maybe the metaphor isn’t quite right, but JPL is far bigger than Caltech, and Caltech is the administrator for it.

Casey Dreier: There are more JPL staff than Caltech staff.

Peter Westwick: Far more. It varies depending on when you look, but say 4,000 to 6,000 staff, which is much, much bigger than Caltech.

Casey Dreier: And at times, the operating fee Caltech received was roughly one-fifth of what it was taking in from tuition or operating funds.

Peter Westwick: The accounting gets fuzzy, depending on what period you’re looking at, but from the 1970s through the 1990s at least, if you add the management fee together with the overhead Caltech got from NASA, it was about 15% of the campus budget, which is substantial. So when some Caltech faculty said, “Hang on a second, why are we running this giant laboratory off campus?” the Caltech administrators would say, “If we get rid of it, where are we going to find that 15% of our annual budget?” It was basically the equivalent of $100,000 per professor. So the administration would go back to the faculty and say, “Do you each want to take a $100,000 haircut? No? OK, then please be quiet, and we will proceed with the status quo.”

Casey Dreier: You talked about some of the stated advantages of an FFRDC: being more nimble, being able to attract talent because of the association with Caltech, being less bureaucratic. When you were studying this, did you see examples of this in practice that made JPL distinct from other NASA centers?

Peter Westwick: One other advantage Caltech provides is a world-class faculty, especially in science and engineering. For its entire history, JPL has drawn on Caltech students and faculty for its programs, going back to the graduate students who first worked on rockets for the Army. You see this especially in the project scientists on JPL missions. Bruce Murray was head of the camera team on several of the Mariner projects in the ’60s and early ’70s and then became the director of JPL. Ed Stone, a Caltech professor, was lead scientist on the Voyager mission — maybe the greatest mission in the history of JPL. You can multiply these examples several times over. Caltech faculty have regularly engaged as scientists on JPL missions, and Caltech graduate students and postdocs also work on JPL projects.

The proximity helps, too. JPL was located at some distance from the Caltech campus after those early rocket experiments blew up, but it’s still maybe a 15-minute drive from campus, depending on traffic. It’s entirely reasonable for faculty to pop up to the lab during the day, collaborate with JPL engineers and scientists, and get back down to campus. That collaborative aspect is another argument for Caltech having this contract.

Casey Dreier: Your book covers 1976 to 2004, but let’s skip quickly through the ’60s. JPL starts making lunar missions, struggles with Ranger, and ultimately figures out systems engineering. It makes the Mariner missions to Venus, Mars, and ultimately Mercury, and maybe caps it with Viking, making the orbiters and helping with the landing. It seems like that’s really when JPL’s identity as a planetary center coalesced.

Peter Westwick: Yes. JPL had been working on rockets for the Army, and there was pressure to produce. We’re in the Cold War with the Soviet Union, and the Army says, “We really need these rockets.” JPL got in the habit of going out to White Sands Missile Range, firing a rocket off, and seeing what happens: “We’ll test these rockets until they succeed, and then we’ll test them a little bit more.” But when you transition to NASA and build spacecraft that you’re sending into outer space, you can’t just test-fire them until they work. You’ve got one chance to get it right. If that spacecraft fails, you can’t bring it back into the shop, repair it, and launch it again.

JPL learns this basically right off the bat with some of the Ranger spacecraft to the Moon. They experience some failures and learn the hard way that the nation will not tolerate failures of these very expensive spacecraft. They’re very expensive, and it’s very embarrassing when they fail. JPL gets raked over the coals in Congress and by NASA, and they develop discipline in both senses of the word: discipline in the sense of an engineering field, and discipline in the sense of rigor. That’s systems engineering — basically a regime to produce technological systems beyond the outer edges of current possibility that won’t fail the first time you launch them.

This regime of systems engineering really becomes the lab’s identity. It produces a culture of ruthless attention to detail, with legendary design review boards where an engineer presenting plans for a particular component of the spacecraft gets grilled and reduced to a quivering puddle, even very seasoned engineers. It also produces an incredible work ethic: If there’s a launch window coming up, you do the work, whatever it takes. If that means 80-hour or 100-hour workweeks, so be it. Some of the commitment is also because you’re inspired by the fact that you are building a spacecraft that is going to land on the Moon, orbit Mars, or visit all of the outer planets. So the transition to NASA brings in this new kind of culture, forged through these early failures. That becomes the lab’s identity, and its success is basically built on this discipline.

Casey Dreier: Then in the mid-1970s, the resources the lab had gotten used to suddenly appeared to dry up. Bruce Murray referred to it as “the bathtub.” The planetary program started pulling back, there wasn’t a lot of work coming down the line, and JPL suddenly had to figure out what to do.

Peter Westwick: Right, and NASA is reprioritizing. It’s ironic, because it’s the moment of greatest triumph for JPL, with the Voyager encounters at Jupiter and Saturn returning spectacular images and all this data showing how diverse the outer Solar System is. At the very same time, NASA is threatening to drastically cut JPL’s budget and cancel the follow-on missions to Voyager, to the point where some people are seriously discussing whether JPL is, I think the quote is, “surplus to our needs,” and maybe we can just close it down.

Voyager mission control at JPL Voyager mission control at JPL The Voyager 2 mission control room at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory.Image: NASA/JPL-Caltech

NASA is prioritizing the Space Shuttle and the [space economy] as well. We’re going to be doing a bunch more in near-Earth orbit and maybe not launching things on rockets off of launchpads, but just lobbing them out of the shuttle’s payload bay. The shuttle is the focus for NASA, and JPL is seen as maybe becoming superfluous. There’s a sense of panic around JPL: We’ve got to do something to save the laboratory and what they see as a unique national capability.

Casey Dreier: Would you call this the second reinvention of JPL, the first being the transition from missiles to the space program? They start new initiatives. For a while, the big focus was solar panels and energy systems, but then Earth-observing satellites, astronomy, Department of Defense work, national security. It seems like they suddenly expand what JPL does and try to work that into their identity.

Peter Westwick: What ends up happening with the bathtub, this gigantic dip in JPL’s budget, is that it eventually recovers. NASA agrees to new planetary projects: Galileo gets rebooted, the Mars Observer project comes online, and then subsequent projects, Cassini and so on. So the planetary program eventually rebounds, and it’s not so much another gigantic change in identity and mission for JPL.

But as you say, the lab did begin diversifying. It was already diversifying before the bathtub, partly as a way to diversify its funding sources at a time when NASA was drawing back as the Space Race and Apollo ended. There’s also a sense of almost crisis in the United States in the 1970s, the malaise, the era of limits. Maybe we need to shift our gaze from outer space down to the many pressing social problems here on Earth.

So there’s a sense at JPL that maybe it can apply its expertise in systems engineering to alternative energy sources, solar energy, urban transportation, and law enforcement. Even early in the 1970s, JPL was working on some of these broader social projects. Then the bathtub comes along, and there’s a sense that even within the space program, there are other things it could be doing. Astronomy is a big one, especially infrared astronomy, and also Earth-observing satellites. Instead of sending spacecraft out to learn about Jupiter and Saturn and their satellites, how about we learn more about our own home planet — satellites that will understand the oceans, for example — and maybe that helps us solve some problems.

Casey Dreier: There seemed to be quite a bit of tension with Caltech around this same time. JPL wanted to start doing work for non-NASA agencies. NASA was worried JPL would do too much work with facilities NASA had paid for. Caltech seemed a little worried about secret or national security work. It sounds like there was a lot of uncertainty about the lab’s identity. Can you talk about the Orange Report?

Peter Westwick: There’s this famous report, the so-called Orange Report. It came from a committee co-chaired by a Caltech faculty member and a JPL engineer, both senior figures: Robbie Vogt was the campus professor, and Jack James was the JPL engineer. I think Robbie Vogt was maybe the primary driver. It came up with all these recommendations for how to improve campus-lab relations, even simple things like designated parking spaces for faculty at JPL. They’d make the 15-minute drive up to the lab and then circle the parking lot for 20 minutes looking for a spot. I’m happy to say those designated Caltech parking spots were still there when I was working on this book, because as a Caltech faculty representative, I got to use them.

Casey Dreier: It also seemed like some Caltech faculty looked down their noses a bit at JPL for not being academic or scientific enough.

Peter Westwick: It’s funny, because JPL thinks they are the best of the best — they’re the only ones who can pull off these missions, sending spacecraft to Mars and eventually to the outer planets with Voyager. Meanwhile, the Caltech faculty, who have very high opinions of their own scientific and engineering attainment, for very good reasons, are looking down at JPL staff as not quite up to Caltech standards. Maybe not the JV team, but not the starters on varsity either. There was also a worry that JPL might do things that embarrass Caltech, either by blowing spacecraft up on launchpads or by getting into these more socially oriented programs, like urban transportation. Why is JPL doing this kind of stuff, and what does it have to do with systems engineering?

This diversification in the 1970s raises a question about identity at the lab. If JPL diversifies, is it going to become a jack of all trades, master of none? Is it going to lose its claim to a unique capability for planetary spacecraft based on systems engineering and become just one of a multitude of contractors, a job shop for whatever agency will pay? So Caltech launches the study, and the Orange Report comes up with these recommendations. Caltech and JPL dutifully implement some of them, and the storm passes. One of the things the Orange Report points out is that Caltech is getting 15% to 20% of its budget every year from JPL. So there are some very concrete benefits.

Casey Dreier: I want to go back to JPL’s identity as it expanded into non-space sectors. You have quotes from people who didn’t find that work as interesting. It didn’t have the same drive, or didn’t seem as important, to do solar energy efficiency as to do a Voyager-like mission. That struck me in terms of what makes JPL unique. Because it’s specialized, it draws people who want to work 100 hours a week and go through the rigors of systems engineering to build the thing that will land on Mars. Once you diffuse that, even though the work is more practical, there’s something less exciting about it, at least for some types of engineers.

Peter Westwick: I think that’s right. When you come to JPL, you are joining the organization that built the Mariners, Voyager, Galileo, Cassini, Mars Pathfinder, and the Mars rovers. Each of those missions was a revelation to the general public. Mars Pathfinder had this little car, about the size of a little dog, driving around on Mars. Then the Mars rovers got bigger — the size of a car — driving around on Mars and sending back these incredible pictures. If you are an engineer at JPL, you are doing things that few, and perhaps no other places on Earth can do.

The testbed rover OPTIMISM The testbed rover OPTIMISM the full-scale engineering model of NASA's Perseverance rover, in its garage facing the Mars Yard at JPL. Its name stands for Operational Perseverance Twin for Integration of Mechanisms and Instruments Sent to Mars.Image: NASA

Nobody has come close to repeating the Voyager mission, sending spacecraft out through the outer planets, past their moons, and returning photos that completely transformed our understanding of the Solar System and of humankind’s place in it. You are exploring outer space and transforming our understanding of the Cosmos and humankind’s place in it. This is a transcendental purpose. As you say, it’s why people make great sacrifices in their personal lives and with their families, and why they dedicate such incredible work to these missions.

Casey Dreier: How did JPL survive this era? People talking about JPL as surplus is a pretty scary moment, and there were some pretty scary moments in the first few years of the Reagan administration. Was it JPL and Caltech working together? Did NASA just change its mind?

Peter Westwick: Partly it was by finding these other missions to get across the bathtub to the other side. The other aspect of this diversification was that in the early ’80s, the Reagan administration comes in and revives the Cold War — which had actually begun under the late Carter administration, but Reagan really goosed it — and all of a sudden military space is very much a national priority. Some of the same people saying JPL was surplus to NASA’s needs were saying the military really needs the capabilities JPL has: space imaging systems, the ability to launch robotic, semi-autonomous spacecraft. Maybe JPL should go over and work for the military and return to its original sponsor.

The military presence had never entirely gone away. JPL had maintained a really small amount, maybe 5% of its program, in the background doing things for the military, like monitoring Soviet rocket launches through its telemetry, and some of its staff had maintained their security clearances. In the early ’80s, it ramps up its military work to the point where maybe up to 25% of JPL’s budget is coming from various military agencies. That’s another way JPL gets across the bathtub. Then NASA comes through its own identity crisis and says, “Planetary missions actually do belong in our remit, and we will resume supporting them.” And JPL can go, “OK, we’re back to our main purpose, and we’re back to building Galileo and Cassini.”

Casey Dreier: That shows the nimbleness of the lab.

Peter Westwick: It’s a very pragmatic approach: “We’ll do what we have to do to get through this.” Since then, the military work has never quite gone away. The last time I checked, several years ago, military projects were still around 5% or 10% of the lab’s program.

One other aspect of going back to the military was the issue of classification and security clearances. This was a problem for Caltech in the mid-1970s and especially in the early ’80s, when JPL was talking about getting more heavily into military work. How can Caltech faculty exert oversight of classified JPL projects? The faculty at Caltech have a particularly strong role in the governance of the institute, and faculty who don’t have clearances are going to be in the dark. Caltech faculty said, “We really want to know what JPL is doing. Maybe we’ll say it’s fine, but if it’s classified, we’ll have no way of knowing, and JPL can just run amok.”

This also gets back to your earlier question about why Caltech was happy to run JPL as an Army lab in the 1950s. That was just after World War II, the Greatest Generation and all that. After the Vietnam War, the U.S. military had a much different image on American college campuses, including Caltech. So when JPL talks about becoming a military laboratory again in the early 1980s, it’s in a much different context. Some Caltech faculty now oppose JPL doing military work on principled grounds. At one point, JPL talks about acquiring a really major project: running a think tank for the Army, the equivalent of the RAND Corporation specifically for the Army, called the [Arroyo] Center. The Caltech faculty get wind of this, and some of them basically say, “Over my dead body.”

There were some less principled reasons for opposition, too, like the fact that military officers would be walking around campus in uniform and showing up at the Athenaeum, the faculty club — a much different vibe from the casual, laid-back Caltech campus.

On the other hand, JPL argued that it should keep tabs on what the military was working on in space technology, just for its own work, because it might help JPL build spacecraft. For instance, what is the National Reconnaissance Office doing in sensors and imaging systems? Is JPL reinventing the wheel on some of these technologies where the NRO or other military intelligence agencies might be out in front?

Casey Dreier: Let’s jump forward to the ’90s, another big culture shock for JPL, with NASA Administrator Dan Goldin and “faster, better, cheaper.” That came on the heels of another embarrassing failure: Mars Observer, a very large and expensive Mars mission that stopped responding right before it went into Mars orbit. JPL had been making bespoke, Cadillac missions, and suddenly it was told to do things for a lot less and a lot faster. How did the lab manage that shift?

Peter Westwick: There’s a bigger question implicit there. JPL is really a Cold War institution. It was born as JPL during World War II, but it was kept alive and really grew in the early Cold War. When it was first building rockets, it was completely directed toward the Cold War with the Soviets. When it shifts into planetary spacecraft, the context is the Space Race: beating the Soviets into outer space and demonstrating U.S. superiority in technological innovation. So what happens to Cold War institutions when the Cold War ends? JPL is not alone in this. What happens to Los Alamos, the weapons lab?

There’s some soul-searching about what the new justification for JPL will be if it’s no longer the Space Race with the Soviets. What JPL lands on is a new kind of geopolitics, focused not so much on ideological competition, let alone military competition, but on economic competition in high-tech industry. This is when computers and the internet are taking off.

So JPL reorients its justification. First, it is promoting technological innovation, which will underpin high-tech industries. Second, space exploration is one of the ways children get excited about science and engineering, so JPL will inspire new generations to enter STEM fields. Those new generations will provide the high-tech innovations that underpin our economic competitiveness, and therefore our geopolitical position. It’s still focused on planetary spacecraft, but with a new justification.

Casey Dreier: And I imagine that was another survival moment: staying relevant and responsive to what NASA needed in order to stay in business.

Peter Westwick: Right. How do we justify sticking around and continuing to send spacecraft into outer space? One is technological innovation, and the other is this public outreach mission. Outreach starts getting a whole lot more emphasis in this period, with websites and all of that. If you look at the web traffic for JPL planetary encounters, it’s huge. I’m sure The Planetary Society keeps track of this, because you’re very interested in those numbers, too.

Casey Dreier: If I remember correctly, Pathfinder’s landing was one of the largest movements of data on the internet at the time.

Mars Pathfinder panorama Mars Pathfinder panorama A panorama from Pathfinder, which Planetary Society charter member Olivier de Goursac helped process.Image: NASA/JPL/Olivier de Goursac

Casey Dreier: JPL’s contract is up for competition for pretty much the first time in the history of the JPL-Caltech relationship. From everything you’ve studied, is it possible to consider JPL without Caltech? How would that transition happen?

Peter Westwick: In May, I think it was, NASA announced that it was going to open the JPL contract to competition. My campus, USC, I understand, is contemplating making a bid, and I think Texas A&M is also interested.

Casey Dreier: Texas A&M has confirmed that it has submitted a bid.

Peter Westwick: One thing I’d point out is that there’s an analogy in the national laboratory system under the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Energy. JPL is unique among NASA centers in being run by a contractor, but all of the national labs have been run by contractors from the outset, starting with the Manhattan Project. The University of California runs the weapons lab at Los Alamos, and eventually a weapons lab at Livermore, in addition to the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley. Then there are national laboratories at Oak Ridge in Tennessee, Argonne near Chicago, and Brookhaven in New York. They’re all run by contractors, some by universities or university consortia, others by industrial corporations. Not all of those contracts have changed hands, but some have, multiple times.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory goes from the University of Chicago to Union Carbide for a few decades, and then to Martin Marietta, and then some others. Even with the University of California’s contract for Los Alamos, the Department of Energy got dissatisfied enough with the university’s administration — “What does this great public university know about running a giant weapons lab?” — that it basically forced the university to bring in co-contractors, defense firms and others. Los Alamos, I think, is currently run by a consortium of the University of California, Texas A&M (interestingly), and the Battelle Memorial Institute. For those labs, it has not been that exceptional for a contract to change hands. But this is a first for Caltech and JPL.

One thing that would change is geography. JPL is in Caltech’s backyard. It’s fairly easy for Caltech faculty, students, graduate students, and postdocs to collaborate on JPL projects, because the campus is 15 minutes away. It’s also easier for Caltech administrators to go up and have an in-person conversation with the JPL director when the lab is just up the hill. That may not be the case if the contractor is, say, Texas A&M. USC, depending on traffic — this being Los Angeles — is sometimes a half-hour drive and sometimes much more than that, but it would be at least a little more manageable than flying in from Texas. So there’s a question of collaboration, and I’m sure JPL and NASA are factoring that into their calculus.

Casey Dreier: Have there been any studies of performance changes at these national labs when they change management? Have those changes been successful?

Peter Westwick: I’m sure they have looked at it, and the short answer is I don’t know. It seems to me that consortia — the University of California, Texas A&M, and Battelle all running Los Alamos — are complicated. It’s complicated enough with UC, Los Alamos, and the Department of Energy as a triangle. If you’re introducing additional vertices to this relationship, maybe those other institutions bring particular capabilities, but I would think that would be offset by the complication of adding more cooks in the kitchen.

The other thing I’d point out is that JPL is not entirely unique even at Caltech. Many universities have what used to be called organized research units: dedicated laboratories or institutes, on or off campus, that are freestanding institutions within the university. Caltech has a couple of pretty good-size ones. Together with MIT, Caltech manages the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory, LIGO. Together with the University of California, it manages the Keck telescopes in Hawai‘i. Those are pretty substantial physical facilities, but they don’t have anywhere near the scale of staff and budget of JPL. So JPL is maybe not unique at Caltech, but it’s certainly exceptional in its size and in its inertia in its relationship with campus.

Casey Dreier: It would be disruptive, if nothing else.

Peter Westwick: Very disruptive. It’s a very interesting question. Every once in a while, I think, NASA would float this as a threat to extract better concessions from Caltech in contract negotiations. And there have been successful efforts by NASA. At one point it imposed a performance-based fee instead of the flat fee that Caltech automatically got every year: “We’re going to come up with some metrics, and if you don’t meet them, we’re going to dock your fee.” Caltech squabbled and squawked about it but eventually accepted it, and in the long run it turned out not to have much of an effect. But this is a whole new level of initiative on NASA’s part to exert control. I will be very curious, as an interested observer, to see what happens.

Casey Dreier: So to answer the question — is it Caltech’s JPL or NASA’s JPL? It seems like NASA’s JPL.

Peter Westwick: Yeah. The triangle has tilted toward NASA over time. The question of whose JPL it is is ultimately a question of the boundary between the public and private sectors, and between independence and public accountability. Over time, in this balancing act between technical independence and public accountability, the U.S. government has gotten much more assertive in insisting on public accountability for taxpayer dollars. You can trace this in the number of General Accounting Office audits passing through JPL every year, and in the size of the local NASA auditing office at JPL, which over time became less and less little. Over decades, you could see the federal government, through NASA and agencies like the GAO, exerting stronger and stronger control over JPL. Caltech and JPL were constantly fighting this, but ultimately the triangle was tilting toward NASA.

Powered by people like you

Together, we make space exploration and discoveries possible. Please make your gift today to keep that work going strong into 2027 and beyond.

Donate

The Planetary Society logo

Empowering the world's citizens to advance space science and exploration.

Account Center • Contact Us • Privacy Policy

Charity Navigator four starsGuidestar logo

Give with confidence. The Planetary Society is a registered 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization.

© 2026 The Planetary Society. All rights reserved.
Cookie Declaration

Read Entire Article

         

        

Start the new Vibrations with a Medbed Franchise today!  

Protect your whole family with Quantum Orgo-Life® devices

  Advertising by Adpathway